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ACCOUNT OF PROFITS, by Peter Devonshire 1
KRISH MAHARAJ 2
PETER DEVONSHIRE’S WORK PROVIDES, for the fi rst time, a much-needed, 
sustained examination of the remedy and procedure of accounting for profi ts 
and the mechanics underlying the duty to account. Multijurisdictional in scope, 
and thus not always authoritative for any particular jurisdiction, Devonshire’s 
work is well worth consideration, not least because of its systematic and thorough 
analysis of the subject. By this I mean that the book not only considers the decided 
cases to describe what the law is, but goes further to discuss why the law is as it is, 
or why it should be otherwise, and if so, how.
After a brief introduction, the book begins with an account of the historical 
origins of the remedy going back to courts of common law in the thirteenth century. 
From there it sets out the development of the account of profi ts (Account) from its 
medieval roots through to its adoption by the Court of Chancery and then to its 
modern application as a remedy granted chiefl y in respect of equitable wrongs.3 
Readers familiar with the remedy and the historical interplay of common law and 
equity will already know some, if not much, of this tale. For those unfamiliar with 
this aspect of English legal history, the retelling is useful and does much to demystify 
what can at fi rst appear to be an arcane subject. Th e term “account of profi ts” alone 
requires some explanation in light of the fact that it sounds nothing like a remedy 
and, as Devonshire explains, actually results from a centuries-long confl ation of the 
name of a procedure and a cause of action with the outcome sought.4 
Having given this background, Devonshire then elaborates on the essential 
elements of the Account and its functions.5 Here the book begins to connect the 
1. (Wellington: Th ompson Reuters, 2013) 178 pages.
2. Barrister and Solicitor.
3.  Devonshire, supra note 1 at 3-8.
4. Ibid at 3.
5. Ibid.
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theoretical with the practical. Devonshire devotes attention, for instance, to a 
plaintiff ’s need to elect between receiving an Account or damages as the remedy 
for a particular wrong.6 Given that the election of an Account is theoretically 
tantamount to ratifi cation of the defendant’s wrong, it is obvious that the 
plaintiff  cannot pursue damages as well.7 Th e process is similar to that in waiver 
of tort, which results in a similar election of remedies and whose name makes this 
choice aspect clearer. 
Chapters three through seven are devoted to exploring the application of 
the Account as a remedial response to diff erent causes of action. Four causes 
of action, or types of wrong, are considered: breach of fi duciary duty, breach of 
confi dence, infringement of intellectual property, and common law wrongs. Each 
action or wrong presents its own set of controversies and theoretical challenges that 
infl uence the application and formulation of the Account in those circumstances. A 
signifi cant portion of each chapter focuses on these specifi cs. Th is approach has 
its merits and the author ties these diff erentiating aspects in well with the theme 
of the work overall.
Th e third and fourth chapters focus on breach of fi duciary duty and allowances 
for breaching fi duciaries, respectively. A reader might initially assume that this 
section of the text would be fairly prosaic because of how supposedly well settled 
it is across all jurisdictions that a fi duciary found in breach of his or her fi duciary 
duties is liable to account to the principal. Interestingly, this could not be further 
from the truth.
What enlivens these chapters and makes for a much more engaging discussion 
is Devonshire’s consideration of the modern contours of duty and breach, which 
have been the subject of much forceful and vigorous debate for decades. Th is 
debate has obviously had a signifi cant eff ect on the potential availability of the 
Account as a remedy, and the potential quantum of any award if a fi duciary is 
found in breach. Cases like Warman International Pty Ltd v Dwyer and Murad 
v Al-Saraj demonstrate practical instances where these changing attitudes have 
resulted in signifi cant changes to the calculation of an Account, either through 
the court’s quantifi cation of profi t, or its decision to grant allowances.8 In that 
connection, it is obviously important to understand the forces driving this debate 
and the consequent calls for change to the fi duciary paradigm. Devonshire usefully 
devotes a signifi cant portion of the text to canvassing these issues. 
6. Ibid at 8-13.
7. Ibid at 13-17.
8. Warman International Ltd v Dwyer, (1995) 182 CLR 544, 69 ALJR 362; Murad v Al-
Saraj, [2005] EWCA Civ 959, All ER 503.
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Th e fi fth and sixth chapters of the book branch out from the general 
consideration of fi duciary duties to a consideration of the other two areas in 
which the Account has a well-established home: breach of confi dence and 
intellectual property infringement. Interestingly, although the jurisdiction to 
award an Account in respect of these wrongs is well established, there is in some 
places a lack of awareness that an Account is an option in these circumstances. 
As a result, the book’s thorough treatment of the causes of action and the factors 
infl uencing the availability and the calculation of an Account when either 
cause is proven is likely to be helpful to the uninformed or even the somewhat 
mystifi ed. Th e fact that a separate equitable duty of confi dence can still be found 
to exist despite the existence of a contractual duty of confi dence, for instance, is 
likely to be of great interest to those faced with a contractual breach of confi dence 
causing only nominal damage to the plaintiff , but bringing signifi cant gain to the 
defendant—Attorney General v Blake notwithstanding.9 
Th e fi nal chapter of the book tackles the perplexing issues of when, how, and 
whether the Account ought to be available in respect of common law wrongs. Th e 
genesis of the debate surrounding these issues goes back to Wrotham Park Estate 
Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd and common law cases dealing with actions for 
interference with property rights.10 Th e fi rst part of the chapter focuses on these 
cases but as Devonshire explains, what these cases actually deal with is a remedy 
that is more closely related to common law damages as a result of its means of 
assessment, which is reminiscent of the basic assessment of damages in tort.11 
Going to the heart of the matter, Devonshire explains that the “gains” referred to 
in these actions are purely notional and act only as a proxy for the hypothetical 
loss arising from an involuntary subtraction from the owner’s “dominium.”12 In 
9. [2000] UKHL 45, [2001] 1 AC 268 [Blake]; Th e Law Lords in Blake essentially decided 
to grant an account of profi ts in respect of a purely contractual non-disclosure agreement 
in the complete absence of any case for an equitable action for breach of confi dence. In 
that connection it is possible to cite Blake as authority for the proposition that a purely 
contractual duty of non-disclosure can sound in the award of an Account. Th ere is little 
chance however, of any court accepting this argument, as few courts have been willing to 
award Accounts in respect of contractual breaches in the decade since Blake was handed 
down. Th e better view would be to accept that cases like Blake are somewhat extraordinary 
and that a contractual duty of confi dence will not attract the remedy of Account, and that 
an Account will only be granted when there is a co-existing equitable duty of confi dence 
that has not been excluded by the terms of the parties’ contract, or been rendered otherwise 
unavailable as a result of a change in circumstances. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 124-26.
10. [1974] 1 WLR 798, 2 All ER 321 [Wrotham Park].
11. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 164-65.
12. Ibid at 168.
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other words, the assessment of these remedies is still focused on the identifi cation 
of something that a plaintiff -owner has lost, even if the loss exists only in theory. 
Th is diff erence obviously distinguishes these remedies from true gain-based 
remedies on the basis that there need not actually be a realized gain before the 
remedy can be awarded. In fact, what has to be shown is that the wrongdoer 
has done something for which the owner might have been able to charge (e.g., 
crossing an owner’s land). Th e wrongdoer may not have reaped any actual gain 
as a result of his or her act by saving either time or money, but the owner will 
nonetheless be entitled to an award equivalent to what the charge would have 
been at market rates. Th e notional basis for awarding this type of remedy is what 
is often called the “user principle.” As the name suggests, the remedy is really 
only a charge for a hypothetical benefi t conveyed, not the disgorgement of an 
actual benefi t received. Wrotham Park is not premised on the exact same fi ction, 
but relies on similar logic by equating the correct measure of damages with the 
hypothetical sum that the parties would have agreed to in exchange for the 
plaintiff  agreeing to relax its strict contractual rights. With this explanation in 
mind, the comparison between the remedies in these cases and ordinary common 
law damages appears to be quite apt. Th e explanation thus lends a great deal of 
credibility to this remedial approach, and may give great assistance to practitioners 
faced with an appropriate set of facts. 
Leaving aside Wrotham Park and the cases involving the user principle, 
Devonshire continues chapter seven by turning to the real catalyst for the 
discussion of gain-based remedies as a response to common law wrongs: the House 
of Lords’ controversial decision in Blake.13 Th e controversy of Blake is due in no 
small part to the fact that it potentially signifi ed an upending of the established 
order in contractual remedies. Th at said, the decision has not turned out to be 
that signifi cant, not least because of its limited practical eff ect. As Devonshire 
points out, few courts have subsequently trodden the same path as the Law Lords 
in Blake.14 Th e likely reason for this, as Devonshire’s discussion suggests, is that 
many courts have simply not perceived the interests at stake in breach of contract 
cases as being in need of protection by such a remedy. 
In his foreword, the Honourable Michael Kirby expresses the view that the 
book is timely.15 In one sense this is no doubt true. Th e signifi cance of the book’s 
contribution to the fi eld of remedies could not be clearer than when it is viewed 
13. Supra note 9. 
14. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 124-25.
15. Ibid at viii.
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against the juristic and academic background of our time.16 In the long view, 
however, it is startling that the Account has only now received this kind of 
attention and sustained critique. By contrast, monographs on Equity’s two 
other great remedial innovations have been with us since at least 1858 and 1867.17 
Much like these earlier works, though, the book is pioneering in its drive to 
bring clarity and coherence to a corpus grown increasingly thick with contradictory 
cases and contrasting points of view. Indeed, it excels in marrying both theory 
and practice to explain both the principles that underlie the Account and their 
application, and to suggest reconciliation where the two diverge. Its insights in 
the latter regard are piercing, and its prescriptions are likely to spur on much 
academic and juristic development and debate in the years to come.
Th e unifying theme in Devonshire’s book is that remedial decisions are 
driven and shaped by the cause of action for which they are awarded, which in 
turn refl ect the interests and rights those causes of action are intended to protect. 
While this may sound trite, it is highly important for scholars and practitioners 
alike to remember that a remedy is a response to a wrong. As such, in much the 
same way that contractual damages are supposed to be the doppelgänger of the 
primary obligation they replace, the Account too must be shaped by the interest 
or interests that it is supposed to replace or preserve. Th is book’s focus on the 
nature of the actions for which the Account is available, as much as on the Account 
itself, is apposite for the purpose of demonstrating not only what the Account 
does, but also what it ought to do.
16. See James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity, and Intellectual Property 
(Oxford: Hart, 2002). See also Francesco Giglio, Th e Foundations of Restitution for Wrongs 
(Oxford: Hart, 2007); Bank of America Canada v Mutual Trust Co, 2002 SCC 43, 2 SCR 
601. 
17. See Sir Edward Fry, A Treatise on Th e Specifi c Performance of Contracts: Including Th ose of 
Public Companies, With A Preliminary Chapter on Th e Provisions of Th e Chancery Amendment 
Act (London: Butterworths, 1858). See also William W Kerr, A Treatise on Th e Law and 
Practice of Injunctions in Equity (London: W Maxwell & Sons, 1867).
